By Jordi Martorell
March 22, 2000
The Iranian elections on February 18th returned a massive majorityfor the so-called "reformers" around the president Mohammed Khatamiin the new Majlis (Parliament). One of the main factors was the highturnout (around 80%). In big cities like Teheran, Isfaban, Shiraz andTabriz, the polling stations had to stay open for 2 extra hours toallow everyone to vote and extra ballot papers had to be dispatchedto some polling stations. According to The Guardian "many voters,even those in districts that are traditionally conservative, saidthey were casting ballots for the first time since the 1979revolution because they felt, for once, that their vote counted"(Guardian 19/2/00).
There was also a massive participation of women and youth, many ofwhom were voting for the first time. The discontent of these sectionsof the population with the present regime was a key factor in acountry where 65% of the population is under 25 years of age and thevoting age is 16.
The so-called "reformists" around the "2nd Khordad" alliance(named after the date in which Khatami won the presidential electionsin 1997) took 170 seats in the 290-seat parliament, the"conservatives" took 45 and the independents 10. Another 65 seatswill be decided in run-offs in April as no candidate got thenecessary minimum 25% of the votes. The defeat of the "conservatives"was particularly strong in Teheran where they only got 1 seat out ofthe 30 in the constituency. Only former president Ali Akbar HashemiRafsanjani was elected for the "conservatives" and there are seriousdoubts as to whether his election was fair as he got 25.6% of thevotes (only narrowly above the required minimum). Rafsanjani was seenas a compromise figure between "reformers" and "conservatives" just a few months ago, and had the support of one of the "reformist"groupings. However he became very unpopular when he started to attackthe most radical wing of the "reformers". This is a big change fromthe previous Parliament where the "conservatives" had 2/3 of theseats in the capital.
However, it is also important to underline that these electionswere far from free. All the candidates had to show their loyalty tothe Islamic Republic and swear allegiance to the system. Thecandidates are vetted by the "Guardian Council" which in theseelections banned more than 700 candidates from standing. Most of themwere linked to the camp of the reformers" and some are even in jailfor "offences against the faith". For instance at the top of the pollin Teheran were Jamileh Kavidar, the sister of an imprisonedreformist cleric, and Alireza Nouri, the brother of another prominent"reformist" who was jailed on charges of heresy.
So, who are the "reformists"? They are a section of the rulingclerics that has become increasingly aware that the old way of rulingis not working and who feel that capitalist development in Iran needsparticipation in the world market and the privatisation ofstate-owned companies. The massive corruption as a result of thedictatorial rule of the clerics has become an obstacle for thedevelopment of the economy and the accumulation of profits in privatehands. At the same time, the economic crisis has created a deepfeeling of discontent in society and the "reformers" think that theonly way to prevent a violent social explosion from below is bymaking a few reforms from above. They have said this clearly. HosseinValleh, one of the main advisors to president Khatami explained toThe New York Times that "the Islamic Republic will remain, but itscontent will change broadly".
This explains the position taken by Khatami during the massprotests last July. While the students who supported him werefighting in the streets and being repressed and killed by thesecurity forces he appealed for calm and disassociated himself fromthe protests. As always is the case with those who try to reform fromwithin, their fear of a movement of the masses is greater than theirdesire for change.
The "conservatives" represent that section of the ruling classwhich is more closely linked to the state apparatus and the statebureaucracy, and which benefits from the massive corruption andprivileges they get from their position. They think that the reformswill open the way to a movement of the masses which will get out ofhand and therefore they want to maintain their regime throughrepression. The "conservatives" are losing ground even amongst theirtraditional supporters. They lost the elections in the holy city ofQom and even in Teheran's bazaars, the financial and trade centre,there was massive support for the "reformers". According to DiePresse (Vienna): "Discussions with the dealers in the bazaar point tothe fact that for the first time a large part of the Bazaaris did notsupport the conservatives in these elections. Employing 300,000 andenjoying substantial financial means, the bazaar dating back to the1960s was a crucial force behind Khomeini and his followers".
But it is also clear that the "conservative" clerics are notprepared to let go of power, and above all their privileges, withouta fight. On March 12, only a few weeks after the elections, there wasan attempt to assassinate Saeed Hajjarian, one of the top advisers inthe "reformist" camp. Witnesses described how the attackers fled on a1000cc motorcycle. Motorbikes of this size are banned for public use,but they are licensed to security personnel in the intelligenceministry and the police, so everything points to a politicallymotivated attack. The tensions between "reformists" and"conservatives" erupted in a full scale clash between the IslamicRevolutionary Guard Corps (aligned with the country's supreme leaderKhamenei) and members of the Iranian air force (aligned withpresident Khatami) on February 22, just after the elections.According to the Iranian paper Emrooz, the clash resulted in thekilling of one airman and the wounding of another 11.
US openings to Tehran
The US and other Western powers welcomed the results of theelections, as could be expected. The victory of the Khatami camp inParliament will mean an opening up of the economy to foreign capitaland the continuation and deepening of the policies of privatisationcarried out in the last few years. In line with recent moves in USforeign policy, Madeleine Albright announced on March 17 the partiallifting of sanctions against Iran. American companies, especially theoil companies, are afraid of losing ground in new investmentpossibilities because of the sanctions. The European Union hasalready taken advantage of the opening up of the Iranian regime tostep up business deals.
Already back in 1995 substantial sections of the Iranian regimestarted to discuss the need for foreign investment and the partialprivatisation of the oil industry and a contract was signed with theFrench oil company Total. At the end of October last year, duringpresident Khatami's visit to France, a number of deals were signedincluding the sale of 100 locomotives from French manufacturerAlsthom and the purchasing of four European Airbus passenger planes.At the beginning of February this year the Iranian parliament passeda law allowing 49% foreign ownership of oil refineries and thegovernment signed a contract worth $1 billion with the French ElfAquitane and the Italian ENI to modernise some of the Gulf oilfields. On February 11th, the Financial Times reported that both Fiatand Volkswagen were considering "significant investment in ParsKhodro, an Iranian state-owned carmaker to be privatised next month".
But there is another, geostrategic, reason for the thawing ofrelations between the US and Iran and this is related to the strugglefor natural resources in Central Asia. The gaining of independence ofthe Central Asian republics after the fall of the Soviet Union andthe discovery of oil reserves in some of these has unleashed an allout fight between the different regional powers (see our articleThe New World Disorder).Russia, China, Turkey (as an ally of the US) and the American oilcompanies are all competing for these natural resources and areconsidering the different options for getting them out of the region.It is in the interests of the US to keep Iran (another regional powerbordering this oil-rich region) on their side as much as they can.This realignment would also benefit Iran as Russia is moving to buildcloser links with former cold war allies Iraq and Syria.
Economic crisis
The main problem which will face the new "reformist"administration will be the economic crisis of the country which isburdened with a $20 billion debt, high budget deficits and inflationat 30%. Unemployment now stands at 16% (up from 9% in 1992) accordingto official statistics, or double that figure according tointernational observers, and the Iranian economy is completely unableto absorb the youth which enters the labour market at a rate of800,000 a year. The International Monetary Fund estimates the numberof unemployed jumped from 1.6 million in 1996 to 2.7 million in 1998.
One of the key causes (but not the only one) for the problems ofthe Iranian economy was the steep fall in oil prices in 1998 in theaftermath of the collapse of the South East Asian economies. Lastyear's recovery of the price of oil (from $10 a barrel to nearly $30)alleviated somewhat the dire situation of the economy, but now it isunder threat again. Many OPEC countries are already talking aboutbreaking the production quotas (Iran recently held talks with Nigeriaalong these lines) and in any case OPEC itself is under strongpressure from the US to bring down prices significantly. This willcreate even more contradictions for Iran since 85% of its exportrevenues come from oil sales.
The election victory for the reformers has raised a lot ofexpectations among the population and Khatami and his followers arepainfully aware of it. The correspondent of the German paper Die Weltwas astonished. "The day after the election" he reported, "silencereigned at the headquarters of the reform-oriented Iranian IslamicParticipation Party." In a very perceptive way he also remarked how"the people are also behaving very cautiously, no loud honking of carhorns as two and a half years ago, when Khatami achieved a surprisingelection victory, no triumphant marches. Although the youth still pintheir hopes on Khatami they are remarkably reserved".
The reason for this lack of joy is clear. We already explainedlast year (see The First Shots of theIranian Revolution) that after the July student demonstrationsmany students had already lost any confidence in Khatami and theother "reformers" because of the treacherous role they played at thattime. After initial vacillation, Khatami sided openly with the"conservatives" condemning the students and helping the regime regaincontrol of the situation. They have now voted for him as against the"conservatives", but the most advanced sections of the students andworkers already have no confidence in the ability of these so-called"reformers" to deliver any of their promises.
Haid Semati, a professor of politics at Tehran Universitydescribed it thus: "The economy is in pretty bad shape. People aregoing to expect this parliament to organise itself and deal with theeconomic issue. So far, it's been all politics. The reformists aregoing to be in a majority, people are going to start asking them todo a serious job. President Khatami will be in a difficult positionin the sense of having actually to deliver on some of the campaignpromises that have been made. The honeymoon period is going to starteroding." (BBC News Online, 24/2/00).
The aspirations of millions of people who voted for Khatami'sAlliance for Democratic Rights are closely linked to theiraspirations for jobs. Morteza Abedi, an 18-year-old tailor supportinghis family in a working class neighbourhood was quoted by Newsweek assaying that: "Young people should have more freedom and young peopleshould be able to get jobs".
Khatami will also have trouble holding together his own followersin the new Parliament. His "2nd Khordad" alliance is a loosecoalition of different groups and factions with conflictinginterests. While his own Islamic Iran Participation Party (IIP),which is the main group in the coalition with about 70 seats,supports his economic "reforms" and his social policies (the easingof Islamic policies against women, a little more freedom of press,etc.). But the other main component of the alliance, the Servants ofConstruction Party, which won about 50 seats, while supporting thesame economic policies is opposed to liberalisation in the socialfield. The rest of the "reformist" alliance is composed of a mixtureof different forces, including the Islamic Labour Party, someself-confessed social democrats and a few former Stalinists, many ofwhom would oppose privatisation while supporting more democraticfreedoms.
Capitalist analysts at Stratfor warn that "masses of unemployedyouth, who have been taught the virtue of revolution, pose a seriousthreat to Iran's internal stability. President Khatami's governmenthas attempted to reform the economy, but cannot solve the problem byitself and is desperately trying to attract foreign investment". Thesame report continues by saying that if Khatami's reforms fail tocreate an economic recovery "Great masses of the population willstill be unemployed and disenchanted with the clerical regime'srepression. Demands for jobs, reforms and Westernization will developinto criticism and rebellion against the government. This will be amuch more intense version of the current "culture wars" as the eliteattempt to hold onto power and justify the regime at the same time.The potential intensity of the conflict ranges from street protestsand repression to near civil war." (Stratfor's "Iran's strategicfocus", March 7, 2000)
Workers on the move
The movement of the masses went into a certain lull after thebrutal repression of last July's demonstrations. We said last yearthat "after the first upheavals, it appears that reaction is onceagain firmly in the saddle. But such a conclusion would be erroneous.The masses are pausing to take stock of the situation. The victory ofthe regime is extremely fragile, its base is narrower than everbefore". (The First Shots of the Iranian Revolution). Since then noteverything has been quiet. On December 13 some 10,000 studentsdemonstrated at Tehran university to support jailed reformistAbdollah Nouri, after president Khatami had declared in a questionand answer session with students that they had the right to protest.In early March, students at the Azad University of Shahr-e Ray insouthern Tehran clashed with security forces in a protest againstrepression and the harrassment of women.
And even more important, the working class is increasinglyentering into the scene with protests, strikes and demonstrations. OnMonday 17 January 2000 about 2,000 workers at the Abadan oil refineryin the South of the country went on strike. According to a reportfrom an opposition group the strike "created an atmosphere ofagitation and struggle amongst oil workers in the South of Iran". Oneof the main reasons for the strike was to protest against the "Reformof Oil Structure" plan which includes making redundant 40,000 of the140,000 oil workers. The strike of the Abadan oil workers lasted fora week and after receiving some guarantees from the management theywent back to work but warned that they would give the authorities aone month period to consider some of the other demands. At the sametime there was another protest of the Ahvaz oil workers which forcedthe Oil Minister to travel to the Ahvaz, address the workers'assembly and promise that "the reform of the oil structure does notmean workers will be made redundant." The Financial Times of March 2also reported how "Iranian security forces on Friday took control ofthe small southern oil-town of Haftgel, ending a two-month stand-offthat followed a revolt by residents demanding a greater share of oilrevenues". In a separate incident in early March, 400 workers at awood factory in Saveh staged a demonstration to protest against thenon-payment of their wages.
A new set of laws passed by the Iranian parliament just before theelections has also sparked labour demonstrations. The new laws willexempt small businesses (those with less than five employees) fromthe Islamic Labour Law, affecting some 2.8 million workers. Thousandsof workers demonstrated outside Parliament on March 8th against thisnew law which will mean that workers affected will lose a wide rangeof rights: maternity leave, maximum length of the working day, theuse of nurseries and other child-care facilities, bonuses, pensionrights, medical care, severance payments and compensation forworkplace accidents. This is the second time that Parliament hastried to pass this law. The first time, in June last year it was onlyaimed at businesses with less than 3 employees. At that time stronglabour protests prevented the passing of the law. Now, the officialnews agency IRNA reports that many groups of workers have threatenedto go out on strike if the new bill is not revoked.
The movement of the powerful Iranian working class is the key tothe situation. The masses having voted for change will be bitterlydisappointed with the new government and this time the "reformers"will not have the excuse of their lack of power, now they have thepresidency and a clear majority in Parliament. The students and thelabour movement will not wait quietly for the "reformers" to deliverbut will take matters into their own hands, against repression, fordemocratic rights, for jobs and better conditions at work, and thiswill inevitably bring them into conflict with the liberals. Democracyfor the masses also means jobs, housing, education, etc. For theliberals it is just their democratic right to exploit the workerswithout restrictions. In this process, the Iranian masses will learnthe need for a socialist programme, one which links the struggleagainst repression with the struggle for jobs, housing and decentliving conditions.
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