Home : Marxist Theory : The National Question
"The various demands of democracy, including self-determination," wroteLenin, "are not an absolute, but only a small part of the general democratic (nowgeneral-socialist) world movement, In individual concrete cases, the part may contradictthe whole; if so, it must be rejected. It is possible that the republican movement in onecountry may be merely the instrument of the clerical or financial-monarchical intrigues ofother countries; if so, we must not support this particular, concrete movement. But itwould be ridiculous to delete the demand for a republic from the programme ofInternational Social-Democracy on these grounds." (LCW, The Discussion onSelf-determination Summed Up, July 1916, vol. 22.)
This words show that the right-of self-determination is only a relative right.Whether the working class should support the demand for the right of self-determinationdepends on the specific circumstances in every separate case. It is a concrete question.It is not possible to take a general position, valid for all cases. Lenin certainly nevertook such a position. It is necessary to examine each concrete case and distinguish verycarefully between what is reactionary and what is progressive. Otherwise you end up in amess. And Lenin's position was shown to be correct in practice in 1917. The nationalquestion was solved in Russia, not by the bourgeoisie, but by the socialist revolution.That is a fact which all the slanderers of Bolshevism refuse to recognise. It is offundamental importance from the standpoint of all those who really wish to understand theMarxist position on the national question.
As Lenin had predicted, the Poles only got independence as a result of revolution inRussia. The October revolution created the conditions for the breakaway of Poland. The PPSright wing was propelled to the head of the government, where they hastened to hand overpower to the Polish bourgeoisie. The latter, egged on by Britain and France, declared waragainst Russia in 1920. The Bolsheviks not only defended themselves against thereactionary Polish bourgeoisie, but carried the war into Poland. Was this a denial of theright to Polish self-determination? Lenin answered the question in advance in his article TheDiscussion on Self-determination Summed Up, written in July 1916:
"If the concrete situation which confronted Marx in the period when tsaristinfluence was dominant in international politics were to repeat itself, for instance, insuch form that a number of nations started a socialist revolution (as abourgeois-democratic revolution was started in 1848), while other nations served as thechief bulwark of bourgeois reaction—then we too would have to be in favour of arevolutionary war against the latter, of 'crushing' them, in favour of destroying alltheir outposts, no matter what small-national movements arose in them." (LCW, TheDiscussion on Self-determination Summed Up, vol. 22.)
These lines adequately convey Lenin's real attitude to self-determination. The nationalquestion (including self-determination) is always subordinate to the general interests ofthe proletariat and world revolution. The proletariat must support the national liberationstruggles of oppressed nations, to the degree that the latter are directed againstimperialism and tsarism. In this sense the national movement can be an ally of theproletariat, like the peasantry. But when such national movements are directed against therevolution, when small nations are used as the pawns of imperialism and reaction (asfrequently occurs in history), then the attitude of the workers' movement must be one of outrighthostility, even to the point of waging war against such movements. That is perfectlyclear from Lenin's words.
The Bolshevik programme on the national question was intended as a means of uniting theworkers and peasants of all the nationalities of tsarist Russia for the revolutionaryoverthrow of tsarism. Once the Russian workers took power, they offered the right ofself-determination to the oppressed nationalities, but in the big majority of cases thepeople decided to stay together and to participate voluntarily in the Soviet Federation.It is true that Poland, and Finland split away, and both set up reactionary dictatorships,hostile to the Soviet power. The Ukraine fell under German control. The Bolsheviks did notintervene against Finland and Poland, not because of the right to self-determination,but because they were too weak to do so. Later they did in fact intervene in Poland,the Ukraine and Georgia.
After the October revolution, on more than one occasion the Bolshevik government wasobliged to wage war on reactionary nationalist movements, for example the ArmenianDashnaks and the Ukrainian Rada, which was merely a cover for foreign imperialistintervention against the Soviet Republic. In 1920, Lenin was in favour of a revolutionarywar against Poland. Trotsky was opposed to this war, not on principle, and certainly noton the grounds of Polish self-determination (the reactionary Pilsudski regime in Polandwas merely acting as the stooge of French and British imperialism which encouraged it inits aggressive stance towards Soviet Russia), but only for practical reasons.
When the Finnish nationalist bourgeoisie, for its own reactionary reasons, broke awayfrom Russia after the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks made no attempt to intervene. Butthis was a reflection of the weakness of the Soviet state at the time. The workers'government was fighting a life-and-death struggle on many fronts. Trotsky had to improvisethe Red Army from nothing. Inside Finland a bloody civil war broke out between thebourgeois nationalist White Guards and the workers. If the Bolsheviks had had the RedArmy, they would certainly have intervened to support the Finnish workers against thecounter revolutionary Finnish nationalist bourgeoisie. As it happens, intervention wasmaterially impossible at the time, but this had absolutely nothing to do with the"right of self-determination" which, as Lenin explained time and again, was onlya part—a relatively small part—of the general strategy of the world proletarianrevolution. The former was always subordinate to the latter, in the same way that the partis always subordinate to the whole.
In 1922 in his book Social Democracy and the Wars of Intervention (sometimesreferred to as Between Red and White), Leon Trotsky wrote the following: "Theeconomic development of present-day society has a strongly centralist character.Capitalism has laid down the preliminary foundations for a well-regulated economy on aworld scale. Imperialism is only the predatory capitalist expression of this desire tohave the leading role in the management of the world's economy. All the powerfulimperialist countries find that they have not enough scope within the narrow limits ofnational economy, and they are all seeking for wider markets. Their aim is the monopoly ofthe world's economy…
"The fundamental task of our epoch consists in the establishment of closerelationships between the economic systems of the various parts of the world, and in thebuilding up in the interests of the whole of humanity, of co-ordinated world production,based on the most economic use of all forces and resources. This is precisely the task ofsocialism. It is self-evident that the principle of self-determination does not in anycase supersede the unifying tendencies of socialist economic construction. In thisrespect, self-determination occupies, in the process of historic development, thesubordinate position allotted to democracy in general. Socialist centralism, howevercannot replace imperialist centralism, without a transition and oppressed nationalitiesmust be given the opportunity to stretch out their limbs which have become stiff under thechains of capitalist coercion.
"The task and the methods of the proletarian revolution do not any means consistin the mechanical elimination of national characteristics or in the introduction offorcible amalgamation. Interference with the language, the education, the literature andthe culture of various nationalities is certainly alien to the proletarian revolution.That is concerned with other things than the professional interests of the intellectualsand the 'national' interests of the working class. The victorious social revolution willgive full freedom to all the national groups to settle for themselves all the questions ofnational culture, while bringing under one head (for the common good and with the consentof the workers) the economic tasks, which require handling in a manner well-considered andcommensurate with natural, historical and technical conditions not by any means withnational groupings. The Soviet Federation represents the most adaptable and flexible stateform for the co-ordination of national and economic requirements.
"The politicians of the Second International, in unison with their mentors fromthe bourgeois diplomatic chancelleries, smile sardonically at our recognition of therights of national self-determination, we take care to explain to the masses itslimited historical significance, and we never put it above the interests of theproletarian revolution."
Lenin and Great Russian Nationalism
Lenin knew and loved the national traditions, history, literature and culture ofRussia. An internationalist to the core, he was nevertheless firmly grounded in Russianlife and culture. Yet Lenin never made the slightest concessions to Great-Russianchauvinism, against which he waged a pitiless struggle all his life. The victory of theproletarian revolution, of course, did not mean the immediate disappearance of the age-oldprejudices and habits of mind, or the liquidation of tradition, which, in the words ofMarx, weighs on the human consciousness "like an Alp". One does not change theminds of men and women overnight merely by overthrowing the rule of the exploiters andnationalising the means of production. Society still bears the scars and deformations ofthe old order, not only on its back but also on its mind.
The establishment of real human relations between men and women, between formerlyoppressed and oppressor nations can only change over a period, the length of which will bedetermined by the level of development of the productive forces, the length of the workingday, and the cultural level of the masses. That is precisely the meaning of thetransitional period between capitalism and socialism. In the case of Russia, where therevolution found itself isolated in conditions of the most frightful backwardness, theproblems facing the Soviet power were immense. This has a direct bearing on the nationalquestion. On the eve of the First World War Lenin wrote:
"Even now, probably for a fairly long time, proletarian democracy must reckon withthe nationalism of the Great-Russian peasants (not with the object of makingconcessions to it, but in order to combat it)." (LCW, The Right of Nations toSelf-determination, February-May 1914, vol. 20, our emphasis.)
And he continues: "This state of affairs confronts the proletariat of Russia witha twofold or, rather, a two-sided task; to combat all nationalism and, above all,Great-Russian nationalism; to recognise not only equal rights for all nations in general,but also equality of rights as regards statehood, i.e., the right of nations toself-determination. And at the same time, it is their task to promote a successfulstruggle against nationalism of all nations, whatever its form, and preserve the unity ofthe proletarian struggle and of the proletarian organisations, amalgamating theseorganisations into a closely-knit international association despite bourgeois striving fornational exclusiveness.
"Complete equality of rights for all nations, the right of nations toself-determination, the unity of the workers of all nations—such is the nationalprogramme that Marxism, the experience of the whole world and the experience of Russia,teach the workers." (Ibid.)
Lenin always showed great sensitivity in his dealings with the nationalities of theSoviet state. The Bolsheviks met all their obligations to the oppressed nations of theformer tsarist empire. In the beginning, the very name of Russia disappeared from allofficial documents. The Bolsheviks just referred to "The Workers' State". Laterthere was a move to set up a Union of Soviet Republics. While obviously in favour of avoluntary federation, which was formed immediately after the October Revolution, Lenin wasanxious to avoid giving any impression to the non-Russian nationalities that theBolsheviks merely wished to re-constitute the old tsarist empire under a new name. Heurged caution and patience. However, Stalin, who was made Commissar for the Nationalitiesbecause he was a Georgian, had other ideas. It is a well-established fact that members ofsmall nations who rise to leading positions in the government of an oppressive majoritynation tend to become the worst great-power chauvinists. Thus, Napoleon Bonaparte,although a Corsican, became the most fanatical proponent of French centralism.
Stalin, the creature of the Bureaucracy, became an equally rabid Great-Russianchauvinist, despite the fact that he spoke Russian poorly and with a thick Georgianaccent. In 1921, despite Lenin's objections, Stalin organised an invasion of Georgia,which was (theoretically) an independent state. Presented with a fait accompli, Lenin wasobliged to accept the position. But he strongly advised caution and sensitivity whendealing with the Georgians, in order to avoid any hint of Russian bullying. At the timeGeorgia, a predominantly peasant and petty bourgeois country, was ruled by the Mensheviks.Lenin was in favour of a conciliatory policy, with a view to winning the confidence of theGeorgians. He attached enormous importance to the maintenance of fraternal relationsbetween the nationalities, and insisted on the voluntary character of any union orfederation. Stalin, on the contrary, wished to push through at all costs the union of theRussian Socialist Federation (RSFSR) with the Transcaucasian Federation, the Ukrainian SSRand the Bielorussian SSR. When Stalin's draft proposal was submitted to the CentralCommittee, Lenin subjected it to a serious criticism and proposed an alternative solutionwhich was different in principle from Stalin's draft. Lenin, typically, stressed theelement of equality and the voluntary nature of the federation: "We recogniseourselves to be the equals of the Ukrainian SSR and others," he wrote, "andtogether with them and on equal terms with them enter a new union, a new federation…"(Lenin, Questions of National Policy and Proletarian Internationalism, p. 223.)
Meanwhile, behind the backs of the Party leadership, Stalin, aided by his henchmanOrdzhonikidze (a Russified Georgian, like himself) and Dzerzhinski (a Pole) staged whatamounted to a coup in Georgia. They purged the Georgian Mensheviks, against Lenin'sspecific advice, and when the Georgian Bolshevik leaders protested, they were ruthlesslypushed aside. Stalin and Ordzhonikidze trampled on all criticism. In other words, theycarried out a policy that was precisely the opposite of what Lenin advocated for Georgia.They bullied the Georgian Bolsheviks and even went so far as to use physical violence, aswhen Ordzhonikidze struck one of the Georgian Bolsheviks—an unheard-of action. WhenLenin, who was incapacitated by illness, finally found out he was horrified, and dictateda series of letters to his secretaries, denouncing Stalin's conduct in the harshestpossible terms and demanding the severest punishment for Ordzhonikidze.
In a text dictated on December 24-5 1922, Lenin branded Stalin "a real and truenational-socialist", and a vulgar "Great-Russian bully". (See Buranov, Lenin'sWill, p. 46.) He wrote: "I also fear that Comrade Dzerzhinski, who went to theCaucasus to investigate the 'crime' of those 'nationalist-socialists', distinguishedhimself there by his truly Russian frame of mind (it is common knowledge that people ofother nationalities who have become Russified overdo this Russian frame of mind) and thatthe impartiality of his whole commission was typified well enough by Ordzhonikidze's'manhandling'." (LCW, The Question of Nationalities or 'autonomization', 13December 1922, vol. 36, p. 606.)
Lenin placed the blame for this incident firmly at Stalin's door: "I think,"he wrote, "that Stalin's haste and infatuation with pure administration, togetherwith his spite against the notorious 'nationalist-socialism' played a fatal role here. Inpolitics, spite generally plays the basest of roles." (Ibid.)
Lenin linked Stalin's behaviour in Georgia directly to the problem of the bureaucraticdegeneration of the Soviet state apparatus under conditions of frightful backwardness. Heparticularly condemned Stalin's haste in pushing through a Union of Soviet Republics,irrespective of the opinions of the peoples concerned, under the pretext of the need for a"united state apparatus". Lenin firmly rejected this argument, and explained itas the expression of the rotten Great-Russian chauvinism emanating from the Bureaucracywhich, to a large degree, the Revolution had inherited from tsarism:
"It is said that a united state apparatus was needed. Where did that assurancecome from? Did it not come from the same Russian apparatus, which, as I pointed out in oneof the preceding sections of my diary, we took over from Tsarism and slightly anointedwith Soviet oil?
"There is no doubt that that measure should have been delayed until we could say,that we vouched for our apparatus as our own. But now, we must, in all conscience, admitthe contrary; the state apparatus we call ours is, in fact, still quite alien to us; itis a bourgeois and Tsarist hotchpotch and there has been no possibility of getting rid ofit in the past five years without the help of other countries and because we have been"busy" most of the time with military engagements and the fight against famine.
"It is quite natural that in such circumstances the 'freedom to secede from theunion' by which we justify ourselves will be a mere scrap of paper, unable to defend thenon-Russians from the onslaught of that really Russian man, the Great-Russian chauvinist,in substance a rascal and a tyrant, such as the typical Russian bureaucrat is. There isno doubt that the infinitesimal percentage of Soviet and sovietised workers will drown inthat tide of chauvinistic Great-Russian riff-raff like a fly in milk." (Ibid., p.605, our emphasis.)
After the Georgian affair, Lenin threw the whole weight of his authority behind thestruggle to remove Stalin from the post of General Secretary of the party which heoccupied in 1922, after the death of Sverdlov. However, Lenin's main fear now more thanever was that an open split in the leadership, under prevailing conditions, might lead tothe break-up of the party along class lines. He therefore attempted to keep the struggleconfined to the leadership, and the notes and other material were not made public. Leninwrote secretly to the Georgian Bolshevik-Leninists (sending copies to Trotsky and Kamenev)taking up their cause against Stalin "with all my heart". As he was unable topursue the affair in person, he wrote to Trotsky requesting him to undertake the defenceof the Georgians in the Central Committee.
The documentary evidence of Lenin's last fight against Stalin and the bureaucracy wassuppressed for decades by Moscow. Lenin's last writings were hidden from the CommunistParty rank-and-file in Russia and internationally. Lenin's last letter to the PartyCongress, despite the protests of his widow, was not read out at the Party Congress andremained under lock and key until 1956 when Khruschev and Co. published it, along with afew other items including the letters on Georgia and the national question. Thus, Lenin'sstruggle to defend the real policies of Bolshevism and proletarian internationalism wereconsigned to oblivion.
Nationalism and Marxism are incompatible. But nationalism is the inseparable Siamesetwin of Stalinism in all its varieties. At the heart of the ideology of Stalinism is theso-called theory of socialism in one country. This anti-Marxist notion could never havebeen countenanced by Marx or Lenin. As late as 1924, Stalin continued to support Lenin'sinternationalist position. In February of that year, in his Foundations of Leninism,Stalin summed up Lenin's views on the building of socialism thus:
"The overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of aproletarian government in one country does not yet guarantee the complete victory ofsocialism. The main task of socialism—the organisation of socialist production—remainsahead. Can this task be accomplished, can the final victory of socialism in one country beattained, without the joint efforts of the proletariat of several advanced countries? No,this is impossible. To overthrow the bourgeoisie the efforts of one country aresufficient—the history of our revolution bears this out. For the final victory ofSocialism, for the organisation of socialist production, the efforts of one country,particularly of such a peasant country as Russia, are insufficient. For this theefforts of the proletarians of several advanced countries are necessary.
"Such, on the whole, are the characteristic features of the Leninist theory ofthe proletarian revolution."
That these were precisely the "characteristic features of the Leninist theory ofproletarian revolution" was nowhere in dispute up to the first part of 1924. They hadbeen repeated time and time again in hundreds of speeches, articles and documentsby Lenin since 1905. Yet before the end of 1924, Stalin's book had been revised, and theexact opposite put in its place. By November 1926, Stalin could assert the exactopposite: "The party always took as its starting point the idea that the victoryof socialism in that country, and that task can be accomplished with the forces of asingle country."
These lines mark a complete break with Lenin's policy of proletarian internationalism.Stalin could never have expressed himself in this way while Lenin was still alive.Initially, the "theory" of socialism in one country reflected the mood of therising caste of bureaucrats who had done well out of the October revolution and now wishedto call a halt to the period of revolutionary storm and stress. It was the theoreticalexpression of a petty bourgeois reaction against October. Under the banner of Socialism inone Country, the Stalinist Bureaucracy waged a one-sided civil war against Bolshevismwhich ended in the physical destruction of Lenin's Party and the creation of a monstroustotalitarian regime.
The regime that was erected on the bones of the Bolshevik Party eventually destroyedevery vestige of the October Revolution. But this was not evident in advance. After theRussian Revolution, the Communist International again defended a correct position on thenational question. But with the development of Stalinism and the degeneration of the ThirdInternational all of the fundamental ideas were lost. Most of the leaders of the foreignCommunist Parties blindly followed the line from Moscow. Those who tried to maintain anindependent position were expelled. The Comintern was transformed from a vehicle of theworld proletarian revolution into a passive instrument of Stalin's foreign policy. When itno longer suited him, Stalin contemptuously dissolved it in 1943, without even calling acongress.
Only one man explained in advance where the theory of Socialism in one Country wouldinevitably lead. As early as 1928, Leon Trotsky warned that if this theory was adopted bythe Comintern, it would inevitably be the start of a process that could only end in thenational-reformist degeneration of every Communist Party in the world, whether in or outof power. Three generations later, the USSR and the Communist International lie in ruins,and the Communist Parties have long since abandoned any pretence to stand for a realLeninist policy everywhere.
Trotsky and the Ukrainian Question
For Trotsky, as for Lenin, the question as to whether one should support the demand forthe right of self-determination was a concrete question, the answer to which wasdetermined entirely by the interests of the proletariat and the world revolution. A goodexample of the method of Trotsky was his attitude to the Ukraine in the 1930s. Themonstrous conduct of the Stalinist Bureaucracy towards the Ukraine seriously damaged thelinks of solidarity between Russia and the Ukraine established by the October Revolution.
Like Georgia, the Ukraine was a predominantly agricultural country with anoverwhelmingly peasant population. A large country, with a size and population comparableto that of France, the Ukraine occupied a strategic importance for the Bolsheviks. Thesuccess of the revolution in the Ukraine was crucial for the extending of the revolutionto Poland, the Balkans and, most important of all, Germany. In January 1919 ChristianRakovsky, the President of Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic stated that"The Ukraine is truly the strategic nodal point of socialism. To create arevolutionary Ukraine would mean triggering off revolution in the Balkans and giving theGerman proletariat the possibility of resisting famine and world imperialism. TheUkrainian revolution is the decisive factor in the world revolution."(Christian Rakovsky, Selected Writings, p. 24.)
The Soviet power was established in the Ukraine with some difficulty. This was onlypartly the result of foreign intervention. The main difficulty was the overwhelmingpredominance of the peasantry. This was aggravated by the national question. Although theUkrainian language is quite close to Russian, and the two peoples shared a common historyfor centuries (Kiev was originally the capital of ancient Rus'), nevertheless theUkrainians form a separate people with their own language, culture and national identity—afact not always recognised by the Great Russians who traditionally referred to theUkrainians as "Little Russians".
The national divide in the Ukraine coincided very largely with the class divisions inUkrainian society. Whereas 80 per cent of the population were peasants who spokeUkrainian, a large part of the urban population were Russians. Thus, the Bolsheviks had astrong base in the towns, but were extremely weak in the countryside. Upon the resolutionof this problem hinged the fate of the Ukrainian revolution. The weakness of theBolsheviks was that they appeared as a "Russian and Jewish" party. However, asthe revolution took hold in the Ukraine, a class differentiation inevitably opened upwithin the peasantry and was reflected in splits in the old traditional Ukrainian nationalorganisations. The most important development was the leftward evolution of theBorot'bists—who were really the Ukrainian equivalent of the Russian Left SocialRevolutionaries. During the Civil War, the Borot'bists joined forces with the Bolsheviksto fight the Whites (Petlyura). Despite the doubts of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, Lenininsistently demanded that they unify with the Borot'bists. After many difficulties, theBorot'bists finally fused with the Communist Party, thus giving the party for the firsttime a mass base in the Ukrainian peasantry. This was decisive for the victory of therevolution in the Ukraine.
It is true that thereafter there were many problems with a "nationalist"deviation in the Ukrainian party. But these were overcome by the patience and tact whichalways characterised the policy of Lenin and Trotsky on the national question. However,the rise of Stalin and the bureaucratic degeneration of the Soviet state enormouslyexacerbated the growth of discontent in the Ukraine. At the Twelfth Party Congress in1923, Rakovsky led the struggle against the growing tendency towards bureaucracy and GreatRussian chauvinism. In a courageous speech at the congress, Rakovsky clearly identifiedthe roots of the problem in terms that closely echoed Lenin's own: "Stalin has onlyremained on the threshold of the explanation," he declared. "There is a second,more important explanation, namely the fundamental discrepancy between our party and ourprogramme on the one hand and our state apparatus on the other. This is the central, thecrucial question." (Ibid., p. 33.)
And he went on: "Our central authorities begin to view the administration of thewhole country from the point of view of convenience. Naturally, it is tiresome toadminister twenty republics, and how convenient it would be if the whole lot were united.From the bureaucratic point of view, this would be simpler, easier, more pleasant."(Ibid.)
The concentration of power in the hands of a privileged new aristocracy of bureaucratshad a disastrous effect on the national question in the USSR. The bureaucratic adventureof forced collectivisation had devastating consequences throughout the Soviet Union, butnowhere more than in the Ukraine. Stalin's purges began earlier in the Ukraine thanelsewhere because of the extent of resistance to this madness which drove the mass ofUkrainian peasants into opposition. This in turn was reflected in opposition in the ranksof the Ukrainian Communist Party. Between 1933 and 1936, the Ukrainian Party was decimatedby Stalin. In one year alone, 1933, over half of all regional Party secretaries werepurged. Many of those purged were supporters of Stalin, like Skrypnik, the Old Bolshevikand prominent Ukrainian Party leader who committed suicide in 1933 in protest at thepurge. This was only the first blow. In 1938, at the height of the Moscow Purges, nearlyhalf of all secretaries of Party organisations were purged yet again. This was a warningthat only complete subservience to the Moscow bureaucracy would be tolerated.
From his foreign exile Trotsky followed these events with growing alarm. Noting thatthe Purges had hit the Ukraine far harder than any other Republic, he concluded that theoppressive measures of the Russian Bureaucracy would place an intolerable strain on thelink between the Ukraine and the rest of the Soviet Union. The danger of a revival ofcounter-revolutionary bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism was clear to him. In the givencircumstances, such a trend could get a powerful echo in the peasantry. Trotsky wasalready warning the world of the inevitability of a new world war in which Hitler wouldattempt to conquer the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, the Ukrainian questionassumed a burning importance for the future of the world.
It was under these specific conditions that Trotsky advanced the slogan of anindependent Soviet Socialist Ukraine. His intention was quite clear: to cut the groundfrom under the feet of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists who were striving to split offthe Ukraine from the USSR on a reactionary basis, which would inevitably mean handing theUkraine, with its colossal agricultural and industrial potential, to Hitler. Trotskyunderstood that a political revolution in the Ukraine would inevitably place on the orderof the day the national question. And he understood that matters had gone too far toprevent the Ukraine from separating from a forced union which was now associated in theminds of the masses with violence, suffering and national humiliation. The task of theUkrainian Bolshevik-Leninists was therefore to give the Ukrainian national movement asocialist, not a bourgeois, content.
A successful revolution in the Ukraine would have had a tremendous impact in Russia andin the neighbouring states—above all in the Western Ukraine, which was languishingunder the heel of Pilsudski's Bonapartist dictatorship in Poland. The reunification of theUkraine on the basis of an independent soviet socialist regime would have led to thedownfall of Pilsudski and the beginnings of the socialist revolution in Poland. This inturn would have encouraged the German working class to turn against Hitler. As in 1919,the Ukraine was therefore "the key to the world revolution". Had the Ukrainianworking class come to power, even if that led to a separation from Russia, the door wouldhave still been open for a federation with Russia later on. However, things worked outdifferently to what Trotsky expected. The Second World War cut across his perspectives.
When Stalin in 1939 signed the notorious Pact with Hitler and sent the Red Army tooccupy part of Poland, including the Western Ukraine, Trotsky warned that Hitler wouldinevitably break his agreement and attack the USSR. In this situation, the nationaldiscontent in the Ukraine would pose a mortal threat to the Soviet Union: "Hitler'spolicy is the following: the establishment of a definite order for his conquests, oneafter the other, and the creation by each new conquest of a new system of 'friendships'.At the present stage Hitler concedes the Greater Ukraine to his friend Stalin as atemporary deposit. In the following stage he will pose the question of who is the owner ofthis Ukraine: Stalin or he, Hitler." (Trotsky, Writings, 1939-40, p. 90.)
He warned that the national oppression of the Ukraine by the Great Russian StalinistBureaucracy would drive the Ukrainians into the arms of Hitler. Precisely for this reason,and in a particular historical context, Trotsky advanced the slogan of an independentsoviet Ukraine, as a means of combating reactionary Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism andwinning over the Ukrainian workers and peasants to the idea of soviet power. On the eve ofthe Second World war he wrote:
"The pro-German orientation of a section of Ukrainian opinion will nowsimultaneously reveal both its reactionary character and its utopianism. Only therevolutionary orientation remains. The war will add a furious pace to the course ofdevelopments. In order not to be caught unprepared, it is necessary to take a timely andclear stand on the Ukrainian question." (Trotsky, Writings, 1939-40, p. 86.)
In 1941, exactly one year after Trotsky was assassinated by Stalin's agent, Hitlerinvaded the Soviet Union, just as Trotsky had predicted. And as he had feared, manyUkrainians, especially the peasants, initially looked to Germany with a degree of hope, orat least resignation. But this soon changed as a result of the foul racist policies of theNazis, with their madness of "inferior races". If the Soviet Union had beeninvaded by American troops with cheap commodities in their baggage train, the outcome maywell have been different. But Hitler's troops came not with cheap commodities but gaschambers. As a result, the mass of the population, not only in the Ukraine but throughoutthe USSR rallied to the fight against the Nazi invaders. In the end, the number ofcollaborators was relatively small, even in the Ukraine. Despite all the crimes ofStalinism, they saw it as the lesser evil.
It is important to see that Trotsky saw the Ukraine as a special case. He tentativelyadvanced the slogan of an "independent soviet Ukraine" for special reasons. Henever advanced the same slogan for any other Republic of the USSR. Moreover, this sloganis no longer applicable to the Ukraine. After the collapse of the USSR the Ukraine—alongwith all the other former Republics—has gained independence. But after ten years'experience of the blessings of both independence and capitalism, the masses in the Ukrainenow want neither. They have drawn their conclusions from the frightful economic andcultural collapse that resulted from this. There is now a powerful and growing mood infavour of returning to the Soviet Union. Of course, the Ukrainians want democratic rights,including autonomy to run their own affairs and respect for their just nationalaspirations, language and culture. They want to be treated like equals, not second-class"Little Russians". In other words, they want a genuine Socialist Federation,based upon Leninist principles. That is also our programme. To advance, under theseconcrete circumstances, the old slogan of an "independent soviet Ukraine" wouldbe ridiculous. It would make us more backward than the average Ukrainian who understandsthat independence offers no solution.
Even more stupid was the attempt to apply Trotsky's old slogan in a mechanical way toKosovo, as one sect tried to do. Having stumbled across a phrase in Trotsky's writingsfrom the 1930s, they repeated it like parrots, without the slightest understanding of whyTrotsky had put this slogan forward or what it meant. The dialectical method, used by bothLenin and Trotsky, sets out from the elementary proposition that "the truth is alwaysconcrete". We have already explained the specific reasons why Trotsky in thisparticular instance (and only in this particular instance) tentatively advanced aparticular slogan. But the case of Kosovo, over half a century later, bears absolutelyno relation to this case.
We will explain elsewhere our attitude to the Kosovo question (we have alreadyexplained it many times before). The dissolution of Yugoslavia—like thedissolution of the USSR—was an entirely reactionary development, which we cannotsupport. And as always in the Balkans, behind each national movement there is alwayssome big power or another pulling the strings. For the big powers, small nations are justso much small change to be cynically used and discarded at will. The decisive element inthe equation was the manoeuvres of US imperialism, masquerading under the NATO flag. TheKLA is an entirely reactionary movement which, in this case, acted as the local agency ofAmerican imperialism. In the given circumstances, as we repeated tirelessly from thebeginning, the war in Kosovo—allegedly fought under the banner of"self-determination" for Kosovo—could only end up in the establishment ofan American Protectorate in Kosovo. And that is just what has happened. If there isstill anyone so blind that they are incapable of seeing this, we are sorry for them.
What has this got to do with self-determination, we would like to know? In what waydoes the present abomination assist the cause of the working class and socialism? The KLA,which is an organisation mainly of gangsters, involved in drug-smuggling, protectionrackets and the systematic murder of Serbs, gypsies and other national minorities, istrying to install itself in power in the hope of getting independence later on. But thisis impossible. An independent Kosovo would mean war on the Balkans, involving not justYugoslavia, but Albania, Macedonia, Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey. For that reason theUS imperialists are against it. But, as the saying goes, "fools rush in where angelsfear to tread". What does it matter if this leads to all-out war on the Balkans? thesectarian shouts. All that matters is that Kosovo is independent! Such madness would bebad enough. But then other sectarians, who are a bit crazier still, add a new and mostoriginal twist: "Independence, yes, but it must be soviet and socialist!"
It is really a pity that the writings of these wiseacres were not available to thegeneral staff of NATO, who are doubtless in need of a bit of light entertainment from timeto time. It would have the American generals helpless with laughter. The KLA was and isnothing without the US army behind it. It is, in effect, an auxiliary arm of the USmilitary. As such, it has no independent significance. Only on the backs of the US armydid the "heroic" KLA re-enter Kosovo. And only on US sufferance is it allowed tooperate. If—as is possible—the KLA gets out of line, it will soon be dealt with.The reality of the situation is that imperialism now rules the roost in Kosovo, and thatwill remain the case for a long time, because they cannot easily withdraw. That is theconcrete reality in Kosovo. This is the "self-determination" that has beenbrought about by American bombs. To have expected anything different was sheer stupidity.Yet there were those who called themselves Marxists who supported this action, nay,demanded it. One of these gentlemen (a "Marxist theoretician" if one is tobelieve what they say) actually wrote to Robin Cook, the British Foreign Minister,demanding that NATO bomb Yugoslavia. Yes, they were all in favour of"self-determination" and "independence" and even an "independentsocialist Kosovo". But now, when confronted with the concrete reality of a newimperialist enclave in the Balkans and the gruesome spectacle of a formerly oppressednationality murdering and oppressing other nationalities, what can they say?
The national question is precisely a trap for those who do not think things out to theend. Unless you have a firm class position, you will always end up exchanging oneoppression for another. Kosovo is yet another example of this.
The National Question and Stalinism
Lenin explained that the national question, at bottom, is a question of bread. Therapid economic development of the USSR made possible by the nationalised planned economy,signified a dramatic increase in the living standards and cultural level of all thepeoples of the Soviet Union. The biggest improvement was achieved in the most backwardrepublics of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Between 1917 and 1956, overall industrialproduction in the USSR increased by more than 30 times. But that of Kazakhstan increased37 times, Kirghizia, 42 times and Armenia, 45 times. Similar growth was recorded inUzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, etc. Yet despite these impressive achievements, nationaloppression still existed in the Soviet Union. The boasts of the Bureaucracy wereunfounded. The following was typical:
"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a type of multinational state neverbefore known in history, is founded on the principles of fraternal co-operation and mutualtrust. It is inhabited by socialist nations (?)—Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians,Uzbeks and others. These are nations of a new type (?) that have no parallel in history.They are nations of working people free from any kind of oppression and exploitation. Theyare linked together by moral and political unity and by genuine friendship of peoplesbuilding a new society. These nations have a new moral and political make-up that ismanifested in a common culture, socialist in content and national in form. They have beeneducated by the Communist Party in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, friendship between thepeoples and respect for the rights of other peoples, in the spirit ofinternationalism." (Introduction to Lenin's Questions of National Policy andProletarian Internationalism, p. 11.)
The sugary myths of the Bureaucracy that presented the relations between the peoples ofthe USSR in an idealised light bore little relation to the true state of affairs. This isnot the place to deal in detail with the evolution of the Soviet Union after Lenin'sdeath. We refer the reader to Ted Grant's book
Under Stalin, the most monstrous acts were committed against national minorities in theUSSR. The Purges finished the job began by Stalin in 1922—the liquidation of whatremained of the Bolshevik Party. About the middle of 1937 an all-out assault was launchedagainst the Communist Parties in every national Republic. A number of leaders of nationalParties were included in the notorious show trial of Bukharin in March 1938. The leaderswere usually accused of "bourgeois nationalism" and executed. After this, theway was open for mass arrests and deportations. The exact number of the victims ofStalin's Purges will probably never be known, but they were certainly numbered inmillions. It was no comfort to the Ukrainians, Armenians and Georgians that the Russianpeople suffered no less grievously. Stalin's extreme Russian nationalism was summed up ina speech that was reprinted in Pravda on 25 May 1945, where he stated that the Russianpeople were "the most outstanding nation of all the nations of the Soviet Union"and the "guiding force" of the USSR. By implication, all other nationalitieswere second-class peoples who must accept the "guidance" of Moscow. Such aconception violates the letter and spirit of the Leninist policy on the national question.
The most monstrous crime committed by Stalin was the mass deportation of nationalitiesthat was carried out during the Second World War. In the course of the War, no fewer thanseven whole peoples were deported to Siberia and Central Asia under the most inhumaneconditions. This was the fate of the Crimean Tartars, the Volga Germans, the Kalmyks, theKarachai, the Balkars, the Ingushi—and the Chechens. The NKVD—Stalin's secretpolice—rounded up everyone—men, women, children, old and sick, Communists andtrade unionists—and ordered them onto cattle-trucks at gunpoint with whateverpossessions they could carry. A large number died in transit or upon arrival, from cold,hunger or exhaustion. Soldiers fighting at the front, even those who had been decoratedfor bravery, were likewise arrested and deported. The legacy of bitterness created by thisact of cruel and arbitrary act of barbarity and national oppression has lasted till today.It is expressed in the break-up of the Soviet Union and the nightmare in Chechnya.
The drive to Russify the non-Russian peoples is shown by the composition of the leadingbodies of the "Communist" Parties of the Republics. In 1952, only about half ofall leading officials in the Central Asian and Baltic Republics were of local nationality.Elsewhere, the proportion was even lower. For example, in the Moldovian Party only 24.7per cent were Moldovians, while only 38 per cent of recruits to the Tadjik Party in 1948were said to be Tadjiks.
One of the most repulsive features of Stalinism was its anti-Semitism. The BolshevikParty had always fought against anti-Semitism. Consequently, the Jews looked upon theOctober Revolution as their salvation. The Bolsheviks gave the Jews full liberty and equalrights. Their language and culture were encouraged. They even set up an autonomousrepublic, so that those Jews who wanted a separate homeland should have it. But underStalin all the old racist filth revived. The Jews again became scapegoats. Already in the1920s, Stalin was prepared to use anti-Semitism against Trotsky. Since Jews formed a largepart of the Old Bolsheviks, they suffered disproportionately in the Purges. After theSecond World War, there was an anti-Semitic campaign, only partially disguised byfig-leafs such as "Zionists" or "rootless cosmopolitans"—wordswhich were merely code-words for "Jews". The notorious "Doctors' Plot"in which a number of Kremlin doctors were accused of trying to poison Stalin was thesignal for a blatantly anti-Semitic campaign, since the doctors concerned were Jews. Afterthe setting up of the state of Israel in 1948 (which was initially supported by Moscow),Jewish culture, hitherto tolerated, was severely repressed. All publications in Yiddishwere closed down, as was the Yiddish theatre. In 1952, the year before Stalin died,virtually all the leaders of Jewish culture were shot, and a large number of Jewsarrested. Only the death of Stalin prevented a new Purge from taking place. Even today,elements of anti-Semitism are present in the so-called "Communist" Party ofZyuganov. This, in itself, is sufficient to demonstrate the abyss that separates Stalinism(and neo-Stalinism) from genuine Leninism.
Now, finally, all the chickens have come home to roost. The USSR has collapsed in awelter of wars and conflicts. "Life itself teaches", as Lenin was fond ofquoting. And life itself has taught the peoples of the Soviet Union some very harshlessons. The failure of Socialism in one Country has been carved on the noses of theBureaucracy which is now busy transforming itself into a new class of capitalistexploiters. No-one can ignore the fact that in the modern epoch the world economy is thedetermining factor. "Socialism in one country" has been exposed as thereactionary utopia it is.
The present nightmare of economic collapse, wars and ethnic conflict are the poisonousheritage of decades of totalitarian bureaucratic rule from Moscow. However, capitalismoffers no way out for the former Republics of the USSR. Formal independence has solvednothing for them. On the contrary. The disruption of the links that connected all of themto a common plan of production has led to a collapse of trade and economic growth, withterrible results for the masses. Most of the people would undoubtedly prefer the previoussituation to the present misery. The reconstitution of the USSR would be a progressivestep—but a return to the old bureaucratic system would not be a lasting solution. Allthe old contradictions would return and the result would be a new crisis. What is requiredis a return to the original programme and ideas of Lenin and Trotsky: a democratic regimeof workers' (soviet) power in which the working people of all the Republics couldestablish a Socialist Federation based upon genuine equality and fraternity and no onenation predominated over the others.
Despite everything, the perspective of the socialist transformation of society stillremains. In spite of the dreadful collapse of the past period, Russia is no longer thebackward illiterate peasant country of 1917. Once the working class take power into itshands, the prospect would exist of at least moving in the direction of socialism, althoughthe final victory could only be achieved on a world scale. Nevertheless, Russia and thecountries of the CIS have a gigantic productive potential, not least an enormous educatedworkforce—a key factor for the development of the new information-based technology.Capitalism has shown that it is unable to tap this potential. But a democraticnationalised planned economy could rapidly transform the whole situation.
On the basis of a modern economy, where the working class is now the overwhelmingmajority of society, a democratic socialist plan of production which would harness theimmense natural, human and technological resources of such a huge territory would producesuch abundance that in a relatively short time all the old national rivalries andsuspicions would recede into insignificance, like a bad memory of the past. The road wouldbe open for a free inter-mingling of the peoples in a free socialist Commonwealth, withall that would mean in terms of human cultural development. Such a vision of the future isinfinitely more inspiring than the narrow and essentially misanthropic utopias ofnationalism.
On to Part Five: